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Abstract 
Research has yet to identify a predictive relationship between crime and the issuance of aggregated 
concealed gun permits. The present study examines if a macro-level relationship exists between 
both concealed carry firearm applications and permits and violent crime committed with a firearm. 
Florida county-level data for concealed carry applications and violent crime are combined with 
police employment, socioeconomic, political, and firearm subculture variables across two 
temporal periods using both county and year fixed effects models. Unstandardized negative 
binomial regressions are employed with multiple alternative model specifications and diagnostic 
tests. Findings indicate a positive association between crime, especially those committed with a 
firearm, and concealed carry applications and permits. The effect size of firearm violent crime on 
concealed carry applications and permits is minimal. There is a demonstrable link between firearm 
violence and concealed carry applications and permits issued, net all covariates. Findings should 
be tempered by the minimal effect sizes. 
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Firearm Violence and Effects on Concealed Gun Carrying: 
Large Debate and Small Effects 
Introduction 
The intersection of violent crime and gun carrying has been a focal point of considerable 
research and public debate. In the area of legal gun carrying, research has primarily focused on the 
relationship between states allowing citizens to carry concealed guns and an associated impact on 
crime (Ayers & Donohue, 1999; Black & Nagin, 1998; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003; Lott, 2000; 
Lott & Mustard, 1997; Plassman & Tideman, 2001). A more limited body of work has pursued 
explanations of legal gun carrying; specifically concealed firearm carry permits. To date, four 
studies have explored indicators of aggregate-level concealed carry permits (Costanza & Kilburn, 
2004; Costanza, Kilburn, & Miles, 2013; Gau, 2008; Thompson & Stidham, 2010); none of which 
have found a systematic relationship between crime and the issuance of permits to carry a 
concealed firearm.  
This relationship merits further examination for two primary reasons. First, evidence 
suggests that violent crime is a predictor of legal gun ownership (Bordua & Lizotte, 1979; Kleck 
& Kovandzic, 2009) and legal handgun purchases (McDowall & Loftin, 1983). Moreover, fear of 
victimization has been linked to legal gun ownership within an individual’s home (Miethe, 1995; 
Warr & Ellison, 2000) as well as carrying an illegal gun in public for purposes of self-protection 
(Bankston & Thompson, 1989; Vacha & McLaughlin, 2000; Watkins et al., 2008). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to assume violent crime could predict legal concealed firearm carrying. Second, a 
methodological hindrance to gun carrying and violence research is simultaneity (Marvell & 
Moody, 1996), wherein statistical models struggle to identify the direction of the causal 
relationship between crime and gun carrying. Research has predominantly focused on the effect of 
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concealed carry laws on violence, not vice versa. Thus, only one side of the simultaneity equation 
has received the bulk of scholarly attention. To progress the discussion of violence as a predictor 
of legal gun carrying, the present research examines the linkage between violent crime and 
concealed carry gun permit applications and permits while employing methods to detect and 
correct for issues of simultaneity.  
There are salient implications for exploring if individuals react to violent crime by seeking 
to legally carry guns. As the proportion of crimes committed with a firearm increase, so too does 
the likelihood that such crimes will result in fatal injuries (Cook, 1991). The extent to which 
criminals perceive increases in civilian gun carrying is uncertain. However, it is likely that 
criminals develop their perceptions of the prevalence of civilian gun carrying in response to the 
publicity surrounding concealed carry laws and incidents - what Zimring and Hawkins (1997) term 
an “announcement effect.”  Given the media attention Florida receives related to legal gun carrying 
incidents as well as the sheer number of legal gun carriers; a total of 1,654,052 valid conceal and 
carry permits as of November 30, 2015 (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services, 2015), this announcement effect is worth consideration by policy makers and scholars 
alike.  
Aggregated Data and Individual Rational Choice 
The present research focuses on the influence of community violent crime rates on 
aggregate-level indicators of concealed carry permits applied for and issued to determine whether 
legal gun acquisition is influenced by patterns of local violence. This inquiry is predominantly 
driven by two areas of the literature; 1) individuals may react to factors associated with security 
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and crime that influence the decision to rely upon guns for self-protection, and 2) aggregate data 
provide an avenue to discover patterns of individual rational choice.  
To begin, scholars positing the collective security hypothesis contend that fear of crime, 
coupled with the perception of inadequate police response to protect citizens, influences individual 
decisions to rely upon a gun for self-protection (Carlson, 2012; Gau, 2008; McDowall & Loftin, 
1983; Smith & Uchida, 1988; Young et al., 1987). Black’s (1980) articulation of the “self-help” 
hypothesis mirrors this argument. Scholars have tried to parse out the complexity of the collective 
security hypothesis through an understanding of legal guns as a response to crime (Garland, 2002; 
Simon, 2002; 2004; 2007). Individual decisions to seek out guns as a self-protective measure are 
influenced by the development of perceived risk of victimization. 
Interactions among neighbors, friends, and family are believed to serve as exposure 
mechanisms that inform people of local victimization (Drakulich, 2015). In the same manner that 
these social interactions generate community cohesion, these same processes provide forums 
where crime and victimization can diffuse among community members (Bellair, 1997; Sampson 
et al., 1997). An awareness of criminal activity within geographic areas can cause indirect 
victimization that has been found to increase fear (Tyler, 1980). Moreover, perceptions of 
increased risk severity heightens sensitivity to possible victimization and subsequent protective 
measures (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988; Warr, 1987; Wilcox-Rountree, 1998). Scholars have 
concluded that interpersonal violence, especially the most serious forms of violence, are more 
likely to diffuse among social groups (Browning, Dietz & Feinberg, 2004; Cohen & Tita, 1999; 
Kleck & Kovandzic, 2009; Mears & Bhati, 2006; Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001; 
Smith, Frazee, & Davison, 2000).   
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Given rates of violent victimization vary greatly across geographic area that are racially 
heterogenic, economically disadvantaged, and socially disorganized versus those that are not 
(Lauritsen & Carbone-Lopez, 2011), aggregated data of larger geographic areas can assist in the 
discovery of trends at the individual-level. The use of such aggregate data for individual choice is 
viewed as an appropriate empirical method to develop underlying behavioral models (Hartman, 
1982). This approach is more commonly employed in economics research to identify patterns of 
rational individual-level behavior in response to macro-level events (Becker, 1976). This method 
has been employed by criminologists to explore individual decision making. For example, Levitt 
(1998) leveraged this theoretical approach in his examination of the sharp disparity between adult 
and juvenile sentencing from 1978-1993. He notes that “…the divergence of juvenile and adult 
crime rates may not be the result of teenagers who differ categorically from earlier generations, 
but rather a [individual] rational response to a change in the relative incentives for juveniles and 
adults to engage in criminal activities” (p.1157). The present research hypothesizes that as violent 
crime – especially crime committed with a firearm – increases within a county, individuals may 
make the rational decision to seek a concealed carry firearm permit for self-protection. As 
individual-level data is not readily available to explore this potential response, county-level data 
are employed in an attempt to discover if such a relationship may exist. As will be discussed, the 
present study examines this potential criminal response through causality tests for simultaneity.  
 
Aggregate Legal Gun Carrying 
The following review of relevant literature centers specifically on studies seeking to 
explain aggregate-levels of legal concealed gun carrying. There are four studies in this specific 
area of inquiry. First, Gau (2008) employed 1999 neighborhood-level data in the city of Spokane, 
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WA to explore the effects of social cohesion, police service levels, and of crime as predictors of 
concealed carry permits within neighborhoods. Drawing on neighborhood surveys and 
administrative data using a weighted structural equation path model, Gau (2008) concluded that 
the level of police service had a negative indirect effect on neighborhood concealed carry permits 
through fear of crime. She also concluded that violent crime had no effect on permits, but fear of 
crime was a strong positive predictor of concealed carry permits. Gau (2008) argued that people 
may seek concealed carry permits as a method of self- and social-protection given positive effects 
of social cohesion and fear of crime, as well as, low levels of police service within neighborhoods.  
Second, Costanza and Kilburn (2004) examined rates of concealed carry permits in 
Louisiana. Using data from 1998, they found that rates of concealed carry permits issued in 
Louisiana were positively associated with median home income, political conservatism, white 
population, and less populated areas. When coupled with no observed effect from crime on the 
rate of permits issued, these findings led the authors to conclude the decision to seek a concealed 
carry permit was likely more symbolic of being a wealthy, politically conservative white person 
as opposed to someone in fear of crime (Costanza & Kilburn, 2004). Third, Thompson and Stidham 
(2010) built upon the Louisiana study by disaggregating race and including hunting permit rates 
under the belief that a sporting subculture would be predictive of concealed carry permit rates. 
Employing data from North Carolina counties in 2005, and controlling for similar socioeconomic 
and political variables as Costanza and Kilburn (2004), Thompson and Stidham (2010) concluded 
that income and crime had no significant effect on permits issued. However, the authors found 
evidence that a sporting subculture and political conservatism were positively associated with 
concealed carry permit rates.  
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Lastly, Costanza, Kilburn and Miles (2013) replicated the work of Thompson and Stidham 
(2010) using data from select towns in Connecticut in the year 2000. The authors concluded, again, 
that crime has no relationship with the rate of concealed carry permits issued. Support was also 
found for political conservatism’s impact on concealed carry permits, while median household 
income was observed to have a negative effect. Moreover, using geographic data to account for 
spatial proximity and population density, the authors found that crime was highly correlated with 
population density in their data, and that the latter was negatively associated with concealed carry 
permit rates. Such a finding may lend support to the notion that a symmetrical relationship exists 
between crime and concealed carry permits; however such a finding was not observed in the 
Connecticut data and future research in this area was encouraged. Replicating control measures 
and employing data across two longer periods of time in the state of Florida, the present study 
seeks to further this body of knowledge by establishing a county-level relationship between violent 
crime and concealed carry permits applied for and issued.   
 
Methodology 
The National Research Council (2004) noted that evidence from studies of concealed 
firearm carrying were sensitive to minor changes in model specification. This, coupled with the 
lack of supporting evidence to date associated with violent crime as a predictor of concealed 
carrying, has driven the present research to employ multiple model specifications using two 
different time periods. The current study utilizes county-level panel data from all 67 counties in 
Florida. Due to limited availability of a key control variable, models utilize two temporal periods 
of 2005-2012 and 1996-2012. Data for one of the key control variables, hunting licenses, was not 
available until 2005. The current study utilizes a dosage effect of both the number of concealed 
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carry permits applied for and issued in each county. Research to date has yet to employ applications 
as a variable of interest.  
The decision to include applications for concealed carry permits is believed to be more 
reflective of persons seeking self-protective behaviors. Totals provided by the Florida Division of 
Licensing indicate that from 1987-2013 (Florida’s shall-issue law went into effect in 1987) there 
is just over a two percent difference between applications received and permits issued. This 
difference may seem negligible, however statewide totals do not account for variation of 
applications received and permits issued by county across time. County-level differences, such as 
incidents of violent crime, can vary and thus influence perceptions of the need to carry a firearm. 
Despite not being issued a permit, this two percent difference is representative of peoples’ desire 
to carry a concealed firearm and thus merits inclusion. The driving research question for the present 
study is rather straightforward; do increases in violent crime rates within a county prompt citizens 
to apply for concealed carry permits?  It is anticipated that violent crime committed with a firearm 
will have a different, and positive, effect on concealed carry permits applied for and issued in 
comparison to violent crime committed without a firearm.    
  
Data 
In order to test these questions we use county level data from each of the 67 counties in the 
state of Florida. Florida’s Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services’ Division of 
Licensing electronically provided county level data on the number of civilian concealed carry 
weapons permit applications and permits issued.2  Violent crime is measured using UCR index 
                                                        
2 CCW permits are applied for and issued at the state level. However, the county level data used in this research reflects 
where the applicant/permit holder permanently resides within the state of Florida. By Florida law, this is the most 
granular level at which CCW applicant/permit holder data is made available.  
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offenses of violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and was provided 
electronically by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. To best isolate violent crime in the 
present study, index crimes are parsed out by those committed with and without a firearm as crime 
committed with a firearm may invoke more self-protective behavior (Cao, Cullen, & Link, 1997).  
The present study includes seven specific control variables that theory and prior research 
suggest are corollary antecedents to both crime rates and concealed carry applications and permits. 
Concealed carry permit holders predominantly reside in areas with higher per-capita incomes 
(Costanza & Kilburn, 2004; Hood & Neeley, 2000). Thus, if counties with lower per-capita 
incomes generally have higher levels of violent crime (Morenoff & Sampson, 1997), but lower 
permit rates, then failing to control for the economic well-being of counties might lead to a 
spurious negative relationship between permit rate and crime (Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). In 
order to control for these potential confounds, we include the economic variables of unemployment 
and per capita income. County level unemployment was gleaned from the United States 
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics program. 
County-level per capita income data was taken from the United States Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Population density has been linked to protective gun ownership (Giblin et al., 2011) and 
concealed carry permits in rural areas (Costanza, Kilburn, & Miles, 2013; Thompson & Stidham, 
2010). In order to control for this potential relationship we include a measure of population density 
(population per square mile) using data obtained electronically from the Florida Office of 
Economic and Demographic Research. Because racial demographics have been linked to gun 
ownership (Dixon & Lizotte, 1987) and concealed carry permits (Costanza & Kilburn, 2004; 
Thompson & Stidham, 2010), we include the percentage of county population that is white (non-
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Hispanic) as determined from the most recent United States Census Report. Partisan composition 
of counties (measured by the percentage of registered Republicans) is included as it has been 
associated with legal gun carrying (Costanza, Kilburn, & Miles, 2013; Costanza & Kilburn, 2004; 
Donohue & Ayers, 1999; Grossman & Lee, 2008; Thompson & Stidham, 2010). Party registration 
data was obtained electronically from the Florida Department of State’s Divisions of Elections.  
Gau (2008) concluded that police service levels had a direct negative effect on concealed 
carry permits, as well as, a suppressive effect on fear of crime within neighborhoods. As such, the 
present study includes the total number of sworn officers from county, municipal, and university 
agencies within each county as taken from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Report Police Employee Data for each given year within our varying model specifications. Lastly, 
gun ownership and gun carrying have been linked to southern and sporting subcultures (Bankston 
et al., 1990; Lizotte, Bordua & White, 1981; Thompson & Stidham, 2010). Though the effect of 
such subcultures on individual gun behaviors is debatable, especially with respect to legal gun 
carrying for protection (Felson & Pare, 2010), it remains prudent to control for in the present study. 
Since our research design uses county fixed effects within a southern state (Florida), the southern 
subculture thesis is controlled for with our modeling choice. We include the total number of 
hunting licenses sold within each county for each year as a measure of sporting subculture. Hunting 
license data was obtained electronically from the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission and was only available beginning in 2005.   
 
Analytic Strategy 
Analysis of UCR crime rates, especially at the county-level, has been a source of debate in 
the literature (Maltz & Targonski; 2002; Osgood, 2000; Pridemore, 2005). The present study 
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employs fixed-effects negative binomial regressions to regress the number of concealed carry 
applications and permits on violent crime and a series of control variables. Using a negative 
binomial regression model to analyze over-dispersed count data (such as concealed carry 
applications and permits noted in Table 1) is more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2013) and is a more flexible modeling technique with less restrictive assumptions 
than traditional Poisson models (Gardner, Mulvey & Shaw, 1995). Counties vary in size and 
therefore counts are not necessarily comparable across counties. Count models account for these 
differences by including the log of the exposure variable (county population) in the model with its 
coefficient constrained to one. Models are estimated in Stata using the “xt” commands (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2013). Two-tailed tests are conducted to ensure proper interpretation of results.  
While some generalizability is lost from limiting the analysis to a single state, the benefit 
of improved estimation and controlling for statewide idiosyncrasies outweighs that cost. The 
overestimation of significance levels in county-level studies because of the “clustering” of error 
terms at the state level is a serious concern. Moody (2001) contends that scholars examining right-
to-carry laws and crime using county-level data have overestimated the statistical significance of 
their findings because of correlation of variables within states. In such a situation, standard errors 
can be substantially biased downward, leading to inflated t-ratios for the shall-issue law variable. 
Using Lott and Mustard’s (1997) county-level data and robust Huber-White standard errors, which 
do not require independence of observations within clusters (e.g., shall-issue states), Moody (2001) 
found that the robust standard errors for the shall-issue law dummy variables in the homicide 
regressions were much larger than the conventional standard errors.  
Most research on legal gun carrying has utilized county-level UCR data that have been 
argued to be highly suspect due to inconsistent (or missing) reporting and attempts to impute 
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missing data are incomplete and change across time (Maltz & Targonski, 2002). While county-
level data are not without obstacles, Lott and Whitley (2003) note that no data are perfect and that 
county data do not face as great an aggregation problem as state data and do not miss the large 
portions of the state lost by city level data. Specific to this issue in the same state as the present 
research, in their study of Florida’s shall-issue law, Kovandzic and Marvell (2003) removed ten 
counties from their analysis because they believed errors existed with respect to crime reporting. 
These counties are each not very populous and thus do not report many crimes. For purposes of 
the present study, in-depth discussions were conducted with crime analysts and statistical 
personnel from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement regarding these reporting issues. 
Following these discussions, we concluded that the inclusion of all 67 counties was pertinent for 
the present study. However, in an effort to account for the possibility that there are missing or 
misreported data in these few counties, we provide two models for each model specification. One 
model with all 67 counties and an additional model with limited counties wherein the 12 potentially 
under-reported counties3 were removed from the analyses.  
Each model utilizes both county and year fixed effects that account for time invariant cross 
county differences (local ordinances) and unobserved influences that affect each county equally in 
a given year (national economic conditions, state laws or federal laws). The models measure the 
year-to-year deviations in concealed carry applications and permits for that county as a function 
of the treatment variables in each time period. The models measure the average treatment effect of 
the violent crime rate on the number of concealed carry applications and permits in each county, 
and the coefficients produced for the 67 county regression models represent an average of the 
                                                        
3 These counties were: Calhoun, Franklin, Gilchrist, Glades, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jefferson, Lafayette, Liberty, 
Okeechobee and Suwannee.  
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treated counties’ effects. Thus, the coefficients for the key independent variables in Tables 2-7 
(violent crime committed with and without a firearm) reflect an average of within-county averages. 
Effects are estimated based on variation within counties, not a pooled cross-sectional estimate of 
the effects.  
When combining data from multiple state and federal agencies, measurement is not always 
consistent. For example, UCR and census data are based on the calendar year; however, data from 
the state of Florida are based on the Florida fiscal year; July 1 through June 30. Therefore, in order 
to properly account for the theoretical expectation that increases in armed violent crime precedes 
increases in concealed carry permitting, lagged measures of federal data (violent crime, 
unemployment, income, race, partisanship, and population density) are employed. The lagged 
federal and partisan data has a six-month overlap (July of year X-1 through December of year X-
1) with data kept by the state of Florida (concealed carry applications and permits, hunting licenses, 
and sworn officers). This helps to ensure a proper temporal ordering of the independent and 
dependent variables.  
The issue of simultaneity, the potential of an endogenous regressor variable being 
correlated with the error term, has been discussed and accounted for in previous gun and violent 
crime studies (see Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003; Marvell & Moody, 1996; Stolzenberg & 
D’Alessio, 2000). In an effort to test for simultaneity, a Granger causality test was conducted using 
two separate models. The first model uses the key independent variable (violent crime committed 
with a firearm) as the dependent variable, with one year lagged values of armed violent crimes and 
concealed carry applications. Results of this diagnostic model indicate violent firearm crime in the 
previous year predicts violent crime in the current year. Concealed carry applications in the 
previous year however, have no effect on armed violent crime. These results lend confidence to 
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the notion that criminals are not making the rational decision to use more violent force to commit 
crime.  
The second model reverses the measures and employs applications as the dependent 
variable and firearm crime as the independent. Both of these diagnostic models were conducted 
for concealed carry applications as well as permits. Results indicate firearm violence is a positive 
and statistically significant predictor of concealed carry applications and permits. Although 
Marvell and Moody (1996) assert the Granger Test of causality is the most appropriate diagnostic 
of simultaneity, a Hausman specification error test was also employed as a supplemental analysis 
to determine whether simultaneity is a threat to the models presented (see Hausman, 1978). The 
Hausman test results confirmed those of the Granger test.4  These results lend confidence that 
concealed carry applications and violent crime committed with a firearm are mutually exclusive 
and that models presented are free of simultaneity. 
 
Results5 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for measures included in the present study within 
both the 2005-2012 and 1997-2012 time periods. Three generalities emerge from the descriptives 
                                                        
4 Coefficients and standard errors of these diagnostic models are not presented given space considerations, but can be 
provided by the authors upon request.  
5 Given substantial academic debate regarding model specification and concealed carry research, linear regression 
models were employed for robustness and confirmatory purposes. Linear regression estimation used Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors to account for both autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence, thereby allaying concerns about 
“clustering” (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). Results pertaining to these confirmatory models are not reported for space 
considerations, but can be provide by the authors upon request. Linear regression models confirmed findings of the 
negative binomial models. Crimes committed with a firearm had a significant positive effect on both concealed carry 
applications and permits across each model tested. Control variable effects were sporadic across the confirmatory 
models; however, there did appear to be a trend of support for positive socioeconomic (unemployment and income) 
and negative population density effects. A higher proportion of whites in a county was only a significant predictor in 
the 1996-2012 permit models. A sporting culture (hunting licenses) was only a significant predictor of permits, not 
applications. Police service levels have a positive effect on concealed carry applications and permits across each model 
tested. Additional models were specified with all violent crime included. These additional models confirmed the 
findings of the models presented. The coefficient for the “all violent crime” variable in the 2005 – 2012 model was 
.00016 and for the 1997 – 2012 model the coefficient was .0000178. Full model reports can be provided upon request. 
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presented in Table 1 and are consistent across both time periods. First, the concealed carry permit 
applications and crime rates data vary dramatically between counties and years. The minimums 
and maximums for each variable have very large ranges, partially due to the variance in county 
populations, and partially do the length of the time series. Second, there are three counties in four 
years that did not encounter any violent crime committed with a firearm. Each county is sparsely 
populated and sees very little violent crime, and even less violent crime with firearms. 
Additionally, the authors discussed the “0” values with FDLE crime statistics personnel and were 
repeatedly told those particular values were actually reported as “0” and not “missing.”  The county 
data for all of the crime rates are censored at zero and also heavily right skewed. The control 
variables have much less variability (except county population size), as the standard deviations are 
less than half of the value of the mean. Lastly, consistent with national trends, the average 
frequency of concealed carry applications and permits is notably higher during the shorter and 
more recent 2005-2012 time period.  
 
[ Table 1. Florida County Level Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent 
Variables for 2005-2012 and 1997-2012 approximately here ] 
 
Evidence presented in Table 2 suggests a relatively clear pattern of the effect of firearm 
crime on county-level applications for concealed carry permits. Across the two different time 
periods, and models that include both all counties and limited counties, firearm crime has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on concealed carry applications. Interestingly, significant 
negative effects are observed between non-firearm crime and concealed carry applications during 
the 1997-2012 period. This finding is consistent with the assumption that firearm violence has a 
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greater influence on applications for concealed carry permits as compared to non-firearm crime.6  
Table 2 presents evidence in support of higher socio-economic conditions, lower population 
density, race, and a sporting culture as predictors of concealed carrying. It is important to note the 
consistent, and relatively minimal, coefficients and standards errors across the models. Though 
statistically significant, the effects lack substantial influence on the increase of applications.  
 
[ Table 2. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple 
Regression of Concealed Carry Applications on Violent Crime and Control Variables with 
County and Year Fixed Effects approximately here ] 
 
 
Table 3 presents results of the primary model specifications and concealed carry permits 
as the variable of interest. As expected, results pertaining to firearm crime almost mirror those 
within the aforementioned models exploring concealed carry applications. Crimes committed with 
a firearm have a significant positive effect on concealed carry permits. A negative relationship is 
again observed between non-firearm crimes and permits in the 1997-2012 period. Unemployment, 
race, and population density control variables are again significant. There are, however, notable 
differences from the applications model with respect to the control variables. Hunting licenses do 
not influence permits while police service levels have a positive effect on permits from 1997-2012. 
The latter finding is somewhat perplexing, as the direction of this relationship would seem to be 
reversed. This finding will be explained further in the discussion section to follow. Lastly, the 
observed effect sizes are further reduced from the already minimal effects noted in the application 
models.  
                                                        
6 As a robustness check we provided two bivariate correlation matrices in the Appendix. The first correlation matrix 
includes data from 2005 – 2012 and the second includes data from 1997 – 2012. None of the independent variable 
bivariate correlations are higher than .70, a key threshold for inclusion in a multivariate regression (see Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2001).   
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[ Table 3. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple 
Regression of Concealed Carry Permits on Violent Crime and Control Variables with 
County and Year Fixed Effects approximately here ] 
 
 
 
Firearm Violence by Crime Type 
 To further explore firearm violence and concealed carry permits, negative binomial models 
estimating the effects by crime type (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) committed 
with a firearm are provided. Table 4 presents results of concealed carry applications across both 
time periods. Table 5 presents results of concealed carry permits across both time periods. Robbery 
and aggravated assault committed with a firearm are significant positive indicators across every 
model. Homicide with a firearm is a predictor in three of the four models (not in 2005-2012 
applications). Interestingly, when permits are the dependent variable (Table 5), each of the four 
crimes is significantly positive during both time periods. Moreover, crime severity appears to 
influence effect size. Coefficients for homicide and rape are higher than robbery and aggravated 
assault. Though these effect sizes are slight at best, they further support the theoretical position 
that levels of violence may influence concealed weapons carrying.  
 
[ Table 4. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple 
Regression of Concealed Carry Applications on Violent Crime Types and Control 
Variables with County and Year Fixed Effects approximately here ] 
 
 
 
[ Table 5. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple 
Regression of Concealed Carry Permits on Violent Crime Types and Control Variables 
with County and Year Fixed Effects approximately here ] 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
The findings in this research indicate that as counties in the state of Florida experience 
greater numbers of firearm violence, the citizens of those counties may react by applying for 
permits to carry a concealed firearm, net of relevant covariates. From a theoretical perspective, the 
finding of firearm crime as a predictor of concealed carrying is the first such demonstrable 
relationship and provides evidence that should solicit further investigation. The present study 
provides evidence in support of higher socio-economic status (Costanza & Kilburn, 2004), lower 
population density (Costanza, Kilburn & Miles 2013), higher proportion of whites (Costanza & 
Kilburn, 2004; Thompson & Stidham, 2010), and a sporting culture (Costanza, Kilburn & Miles 
2013) as predictors of concealed carrying. Moreover, these models suggest that per capita income 
may be a more reliable socioeconomic measure across time. Though not directly measured in the 
present study, the findings suggest fear of crime may be correlated with an individual’s desire to 
pursue a concealed carry license.  
A theoretically perplexing finding was that police service levels were shown to have a 
positive effect on concealed carry applications and permits. This relationship is in the opposite 
direction as expected, as increases in police service levels are believed to have a suppressive effect 
on concealed carrying. One plausible explanation for this finding may be that increases in violent 
crime were met with increases in police personnel, yet diagnostic tests revealed no correlation 
between firearm crime in year one and police service levels in year two. It is also unlikely that 
additional police would be hired in response to firearm crime as public safety budgets in Florida 
were rather sparse and the temporal time frame is short for hiring purposes. Though it cannot be 
said for certain, this relationship may be spurious within the available data. Nonetheless, it appears 
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prudent to include police service levels in future examinations of predictors of concealed carrying. 
Future studies should also attempt to capture individual-level perceptions and behaviors, as well 
as, meso-/macro-level data similar to Gau’s (2008) study. Relatedly, counties are typically large 
geographies that may consist of varying high- and low-crime areas within a single county. As the 
growing literature regarding crime and place has shown, micro-units of place are more ideal than 
larger areas defined by formal boundaries (i.e., county lines). Future research examining concealed 
gun carrying and crime should attempt to gather micro-meso levels of data to better isolate 
environmental differences within counties, or perhaps on the boundaries between counties.  
Deterrence and rational choice theory posits that an increase in the perceived costs of crime 
– the likelihood of encountering an armed victim – may deter criminal activity, particularly as the 
number of permits issued within a state increases over time (Lott & Mustard, 1997). The opposite 
effect is a policy issue that is commonly overlooked; the potentially undesirable and adverse 
changes in the behavior of criminals in response to perceptions of increased civilian gun carrying 
(Ludwig, 2000). For example, recent research suggests robbery offenders make determinations on 
the amount of force to use at the onset of a robbery based on their perception of a potential victim’s 
likelihood that they are carrying a weapon (Lindegaard, Bernasco, & Jacques, 2014). Wright and 
Rossi (1994) interviewed imprisoned offenders who used firearms to commit their crimes and 
noted that approximately two-thirds reported that the decision to carry a gun for purposes of 
committing their crime was influenced by the prospect of encountering an armed victim. It is 
plausible that such perceptions among criminals may lead to increases in the use of firearms to 
commit violent crime where previously such levels of force were not utilized. Respondents to the 
2012 National Crime Victimization Survey indicated that only seven percent of violent crime was 
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committed with a firearm, a proportion that has been consistent since 2003 (Truman, Langton & 
Plenty, 2013).  
Though the association found between armed violent crime rates and concealed carry 
permit application rates was consistent, it was also minimal in magnitude. It seems the level of 
debate surrounding violence and concealed carrying far outweighs any observed effects. While it 
appears armed violent crime is related to higher levels of concealed carry applications and permits, 
we acknowledge that other factors are just as – if not more – important and highlight the need for 
more refined research to parse out any plausible relationships. Moreover, it should be noted that 
the relationship between other explanatory variables (such as population density and 
unemployment) and concealed carry permit application rates was substantively larger than was 
found for armed violent crime. The impact of these findings on policy is less apparent. Though 
these findings may be statistically significant, the effects sizes are so small as to provide no reason 
to believe substantial policy changes would impact conceal carry application rates. Ostensibly, less 
guns on the street is a good thing, however even an extreme reduction in violent crime would only 
have a minimal effect on the number of concealed carry applications and permits issued.  
The present study is not without limitations. Fear of crime has been shown to influence 
civilian gun ownership (Miethe, 1995; Warr & Ellison, 2000), and we extend that argument to 
include concealed carry applications permits. However, we do not directly measure “fear of 
crime.”  We infer that actual crime (in our case armed violent crime) motivates civilians to apply 
for concealed carry permits. In an optimal world we measure fear of crime more directly, perhaps 
though surveys. However, that would bring with it a number of other complications. First, with a 
small fraction of the population actually applying for these licenses, it would be very difficult to 
include enough applicants in a random sample of Floridians. Additionally, concealed carry 
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applicants and permit holders are exempt from public record requests in Florida, which prevents a 
direct sampling of applicants and permit holders.  
Another limitation, as mentioned previously, the appropriate unit of analysis in macro-
/meso-level research has been a point of contention among scholars. The less-than pristine 
approach of using UCR county-level crime data, for the potentially problematic reasons discussed 
by Maltz and Targonski (2002) and Pridemore (2005), was determined to be the most appropriate 
method available. The aforementioned justification for examining county-level effects of armed 
violent crime on concealed carry applications and permits is coupled with the availability of such 
data. Due to legislation safeguarding concealed carry permit-holder information; county-level data 
are perhaps the most-fine grained source of administrative insight available in the state of Florida.  
We acknowledge that the use of Florida as a state to conduct concealed carry-related 
research has been called into question. Though the present study is not directed toward the potential 
impacts of shall-issue laws, Black and Nagin (1998) contend that estimates of shall-issue law 
effects are extremely sensitive to the inclusion of Florida to the extent that models including 
Florida, or of Florida itself, produce systematic prediction errors while others have found Florida 
to negatively skew crime estimates related to concealed carry laws (Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). 
The present research utilized Florida given its availability of data as well as the state’s culture 
surrounding firearm prevalence, violent crime rates, and that the state currently has the most active 
concealed carry permits per capita in the United States.  
Moreover, Florida’s “stand-your-ground” law allows legal gun carriers to use firearms in 
self-defense when they believe they are in danger of death or serious bodily harm. Stand-your-
ground laws remove an individual’s duty to retreat, even if a safe route of retreat or escape is 
available, from any place a person has a lawful right to be. The present research is not concerned 
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with the plausible link between stand-your-ground laws and violent crime, but such laws do 
possibly create a sense of legislative empowerment for individuals to seek protective mechanisms 
in the form of a concealed firearm. Citizens living in states that legally require people to retreat, 
as opposed to stand-your-ground, may feel a concealed carry weapon will be less effective in the 
face of a violent offender given a more stringent legal threshold for the justification of using the 
firearm for self-protection. Floridians may perceive the state’s stand-your-ground laws as a 
mechanism to enhance the effectiveness of a concealed firearm as a legitimate means of self-
protective behavior. 
In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated a significant relationship between 
firearm crime and subsequent applications and issuance of concealed carry gun permits. This 
finding was consistent across two temporal periods and net other informative covariates. Scholars 
should seek to build upon these findings to further explore the nexus between the levels of violence 
in crime incidents, individual fear of crime, and a desire pursue self-protection in the form of 
concealed gun carrying.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Florida County Level Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables for 2005-2012 and 1997-2012 
1Violent crime consists of data from the UCR: homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault and is incidents per 100,000 of population.  
2The remaining “0” in the “Violent Crime w a Firearm” variable from three counties in four years. Each county is sparsely populated and sees very little violent 
crime, and even less violent crime with firearms. Additionally, the authors discussed the “0” values with FDLE Crime Statistics Personnel and were assured those 
particular values were actually reported as “0” and not “missing”.   
3Income per capita is in thousands of dollars. 
4Overall standard deviations are reported as opposed to within-county standard deviations. The latter is arguably more appropriate given the unit of analysis. 
However, overall standard deviations are believed to best describe the data and illustrate variance across the state of Florida as within-county standard deviations 
would be highly suppressed in cases where within-county measures (such as racial or political composition) are not likely to vary from year to year.  
 
 
 
 2005 - 2012 1997 - 2012 
N = 536 Mean Standard 
Deviation4 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation4 
Minimum Maximum 
Concealed Carry Applications 1380.49 2116.36 6 13123 831.48 1583.38 1 13123 
Concealed Carry Applications 
per 100k 
 
521.44 
 
281.77 
 
75.27 
 
1874.11 325.28 271.86 14.02 1874.11 
Concealed Carry Permits 536 7963.54 48 87998 5664.58 9981.7 19 87998 
Concealed Carry Permits per 
100k 
 
2878.75 
 
1439.33 
 
633.16 
 
9406.06 2050.31 1325.63 181.07 9406.06 
Violent Crime w/ a Firearm per 
100k 1, 2 99.34 68.98 0 482.18 108.91 74.05 0 566.53 
Violent Crime w/o Firearm per 
100k 412.36 199.52 35.84 1385.68 470.74 223.41 35.84 1385.68 
Unemployment Rate 7.08 3.26 2.10 15.60 5.96 2.81 2.1 15.6 
Income Per Capita3 32.54 10.02 15.47 66.43 27.936 9.73 11.21 66.43 
Percent White 70.78 14.29 15.40 91.20 74.58 14.29 15.4 97.1 
Percent Republican 35.02 11.33 7.90 63.30 33.6 13.41 3.66 63.7 
Population Per Square Mile 336.58 524.05 9.07 3462.75 311.37 505.25 8.40 3462.75 
Sworn Officers per 100k 222.56 117.73 57.24 1115.84 218.94 98.16 51.81 1115.84 
Hunting Licenses per 100k 1197.39 1290 39.70 6115.23 N/A 
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Table 2. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression of Concealed Carry 
Applications on Violent Crime and Control Variables with County and Year Fixed Effects.1  
 All Counties 
Concealed Carry 
Applications 
2005 – 2012 
Limited Counties  
Concealed Carry 
Applications 
2005 – 20122 
All Counties 
Concealed Carry 
Applications 
1997 – 2012 
Limited Counties 
Concealed Carry 
Applications 
1997 – 20122 
Violent Crime w/ Firearm 0.0006** (0.0002) 0.0007*** (0.0002) 0.0009*** (0.0002) 0.0010*** (0.0002) 
Violent Crime w/o Firearm  0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) 
Unemployment -0.0418*** (0.0101) -0.0369*** (0.0108) -0.0408*** (0.0071) -0.0378*** (0.0076) 
Per Capita Income 0.0029 (0.0040) 0.0071 (0.0041) -0.0014 (0.0025) 0.0014 (0.0026) 
Percent White 0.0081** (0.0026) 0.0080** (0.0028) 0.0002 (0.0012) -0.0001 (0.0012) 
Percent Republican 0.0010 (0.0024) 0.0035 (0.0025) -0.0015 (0.0017) 0.0019 (0.0018) 
Population Per Square Mile -0.0009*** (0.0002) -0.0007*** (0.0002) -0.0008*** (0.0001) -0.0006*** (0.0001) 
Sworn Officers Per 100k 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0005*** (0.0001) 0.0005*** (0.0002) 
Hunting Licenses Per 100k 0.0002*** (0.0000) 0.0002*** (0.0001)     
Groups 67  55  67  55  
Observations Per Group 8  8  16  16  
N 536  440  1072  880  
Wald Chi2 5344.85  4951.53  18472.90  17591.57  
1Standard errors are presented next to the coefficients in each model. The Negative Binomial models were estimated with county and year fixed effects, those 
results are omitted.  
2The following counties are removed from the analysis: Calhoun, Franklin, Gilchrist, Glades, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jefferson, Lafayette, Liberty, Okeechobee 
and Suwannee.    
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 3. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression of Concealed Carry Permits on Violent 
Crime and Control Variables with County and Year Fixed Effects.1  
 All Counties  
Concealed Carry Permits 
2005 – 2012 
Limited Counties  
Concealed Carry Permits 
2005 – 20122 
All Counties 
Concealed Carry Permits 
1997 – 2012 
Limited Counties 
Concealed Carry Permits 
1997 – 20122 
Violent Crime w/ Firearm 0.0004*** (0.0001) 0.0004** (0.0001) 0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0008*** (0.0001) 
Violent Crime w/o Firearm  0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001** (0.0000) 0.0001** (0.0000) 
Unemployment -0.0353*** (0.0063) -0.0313*** (0.0067) -0.0081 (0.0049) -0.0033 (0.0053) 
Per Capita Income 0.0012 (0.0028) 0.0028 (0.00029) -0.0150*** (0.0022) -0.0124*** (0.0023) 
Percent White 0.0057*** (0.0018) 0.0051 (0.0019) 0.0035*** (0.0008) 0.0034*** (0.0009) 
Percent Republican 0.0022 (0.0015) 0.0029 (0.0016) 0.0022 (0.0012) 0.0048*** (0.0013) 
Population Per Square Mile -0.0005*** (0.0001) -0.0004*** (0.0001) -0.0009*** (0.0001) -0.0006*** (0.0001) 
Sworn Officers Per 100k 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0005*** (0.0001) 0.0007*** (0.0001) 
Hunting Licenses Per 100k -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0001)     
Groups 67  55  67  55  
Observations Per Group 8  8  16  16  
N 536  440  1072  880  
Wald Chi2 12641.34  11798.19  16996.97  14940.21  
1Standard errors are presented next to the coefficients in each model. The Negative Binomial models were estimated with county and year fixed effects, those 
results are omitted.  
2The following counties are removed from the analysis: Calhoun, Franklin, Gilchrist, Glades, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jefferson, Lafayette, Liberty, Okeechobee 
and Suwannee.     
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression of Concealed Carry Applications on 
Violent Crime Types and Control Variables with County and Year Fixed Effects.1 
 Concealed Carry Applications 2005 – 2012 Concealed Carry Applications 1997 – 2012 
Firearm Homicide 0.0025 
(0.0037) 
 
  
0.0130*** 
(0.0033) 
 
 
 
Firearm Rape 
 
0.0079 
(0.0068)    
-0.0087 
0.0050   
Firearm Robbery 
  
0.0009** 
0.0004    
0.0008** 
(0.0003)  
Firearm Aggravated Assault 
   
0.0010** 
(0.0004)    
0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
Unemployment -0.0476*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0478*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0432*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0448*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0393*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0414*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0394*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.0429*** 
(0.0072) 
Per Capita Income 0.0018 
(0.0040) 
0.0002 
(0.0019) 
0.0023 
(0.0040) 
0.0024 
(0.0040) 
-0.0014 
(0.0024) 
-0.0019 
(0.0024) 
-0.0019 
(0.0025) 
-0.0017 
(0.0025) 
Percent White 0.0083** 
(0.0026) 
0.0039 
(0.0026) 
0.0079** 
(0.0026) 
0.0082*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0009 
(0.0012) 
0.0018 
(0.0013) 
0.0006 
(0.0013) 
0.0003 
(0.0012) 
Percent Republican 0.0018 
(0.0023) 
0.0018 
(0.0023) 
0.0016 
(0.0023) 
0.0019 
(0.0023) 
-0.0016 
(0.0017) 
-0.0023 
(0.0017) 
-0.0023 
(0.0017) 
-0.0019 
(0.0017) 
Population Per Square Mile -0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
Sworn Officers Per 100k 0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
Hunting Licenses Per 100k 0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000)     
Groups 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Observations Per Group 8 8 8 8 16 16 16 16 
N 536 536 536 536 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Wald Chi2 5115.01 5141.53 5269.86 5267.64 17724.65 17058.73 17810.13 17897.51 
1Models include all Florida counties. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficients is each model. The Negative Binomial models were 
estimated with county and year fixed effects, those results are omitted.  
Note: All 67 counties are included in each model in Table 4. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001in a two-tailed test.    
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Table 5. Unstandardized Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression of Concealed Carry Permits on Violent 
Crime Types and Control Variables with County and Year Fixed Effects.1  
 Concealed Carry Permits 2005 – 2012 Concealed Carry Permits 1997 – 2012 
Firearm Homicide 0.0061* 
(0.0026) 
 
  
0.0124*** 
(0.0024) 
 
 
 
Firearm Rape 
 
0.0151*** 
(0.0047)    
0.0125*** 
(0.0038)   
Firearm Robbery 
  
0.0007*** 
(0.0002)    
0.0013*** 
(0.0002)  
Firearm Aggravated Assault 
   
0.0007** 
(0.0002)    
0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
Unemployment -0.0376*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0377*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0356*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0374*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0088 
(0.0051) 
-0.0101 
(0.0051) 
-0.0076 
(0.0050) 
-0.0119* 
(0.0050) 
Per Capita Income 0.0012 
(0.0028) 
0.0011 
(0.0028) 
0.0011 
(0.0028) 
0.0009 
(0.0028) 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0129*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0145*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0143*** 
(0.0022) 
Percent White 0.0061*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0060*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0054*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0053*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0054*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0008) 
Percent Republican 0.0023 
(0.0015) 
0.0023 
(0.0015) 
0.0020 
(0.0015) 
0.0022 
(0.0015) 
0.0020 
(0.0012) 
0.0017 
(0.0012) 
0.0017 
(0.0012) 
0.0022 
(0.0012) 
Population Per Square Mile -0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
Sworn Officers Per 100k 0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Hunting Licenses Per 100k -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001)     
Groups 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Observations Per Group 8 8 8 8 16 16 16 16 
N 536 536 536 536 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Wald Chi2 12116 12487.11 12501.30 12294.83 15682.30 15514.75 16297.14 16320.65 
1Notes: Models include all Florida counties. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficients is each model. The Negative Binomial models 
were estimated with county and year fixed effects, those results are omitted.  
Note: All 67 counties are included in each model in Table 5. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001in a two-tailed test.    
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Appendix A 
 
Correlation Matrix for Variables from 2005 – 2012  
 
 CCW 
Applications 
CCW 
Permits 
Violent 
Crime 
w/ 
Firearm 
Violent 
Crime 
w/o 
Firearm 
Unemployment Per 
Capita 
Income 
Percent 
White 
Percent 
Republican 
Population 
Per Square 
Mile 
Sworn 
Officers 
Per 100k 
Hunting 
Licenses 
Per 100k 
CCW 
Applications  1           
CCW Permits 0.951 1          
Violent Crime 
w/ Firearm 0.463 0.424 1         
Violent Crime 
w/o Firearm  0.067 0.061 0.522 1        
Unemployment 0.247 0.209 -0.004 -0.182 1       
Per Capita 
Income 0.357 0.361 0.084 -0.014 0.061 1      
Percent White -0.416 -0.425 -0.483 -0.340 -0.135 0.074 1     
Percent 
Republican 0.104 0.091 -0.076 -0.184 0.062 0.545 0.400 1    
Population Per 
Square Mile 0.654 0.671 0.413 0.128 0.041 0.353 -0.206 0.145 1   
Sworn Officers 
Per 100k -0.060 -0.058 -0.010 0.099 0.080 -0.015 0.003 -0.133 -0.082 1  
Hunting 
Licenses Per 
100k -0.410 -0.415 -0.222 -0.003 -0.107 -0.439 0.247 -0.409 -0.406 0.184 1 
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Correlation Matrix for Variables from 1996 – 2012  
 
 CCW 
Applications 
CCW 
Permits 
Violent 
Crime w/ 
Firearm 
Violent 
Crime w/o 
Firearm 
Unemployment Per 
Capita 
Income 
Percent 
White 
Percent 
Republican 
Population 
Per Square 
Mile 
Sworn 
Officers 
Per 100k 
CCW 
Applications  1          
CCW Permits 0.921 1         
Violent Crime w/ 
Firearm 0.305 0.366 1        
Violent Crime 
w/o Firearm  0.010 0.091 0.649 1       
Unemployment 0.297 0.219 -0.007 -0.166 1      
Per Capita 
Income 0.438 0.427 -0.026 -0.083 0.148 1     
Percent White -0.383 -0.406 -0.359 -0.205 -0.205 -0.049 1    
Percent 
Republican 0.159 0.173 -0.027 -0.043 0.013 0.575 0.309 1   
Population Per 
Square Mile 0.555 0.634 0.355 0.191 -0.004 0.350 -0.157 0.246 1  
Sworn Officers 
Per 100k -0.030 -0.016 0.032 0.140 0.093 0.075 -0.050 -0.052 -0.045 1 
 
  
